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Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in
Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and
Modern Practice
Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos*
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Code of Louisiana regards the contract of broker-
age1 as a species of mandate.2 In several cases the courts follow-
ing the Code and its terminology have declared that brokerage
is a mandate, agency, or procuration ;3 in others, brokerage was
classified as a contract for "labor or industry ' 4 or simply as an
"employment" contract."
Classification in such cases is not simply a problem of
semantics. The rules applicable to these various legal relations
differ substantially6 and a certain classification may result in
very important legal consequences for the interested parties. It
is the thesis of this paper that brokerage, mandate, and agency
involve distinct and distinguishable legal relations under Lou-
isiana law and that the issues raised in a brokerage contract
may be better appreciated by classifying brokerage as a sui
generis contract which may or may not coincide with agency and
mandate.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. As the principle of contractual freedom is a fundamental precept in the
Louisiana Civil Code (of. Art. 1764), the contract of brokerage may assume sev-
eral forms. The typical brokerage contract may be described as an agreement
whereby a person (principal) promises to another (broker) a commission for the
service of producing a prospect willing, able, and ready to buy, the broker making
no return promise that he can or will render such service. Cf. 1 CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS 150, 151 (1950). It amounts in substance "to an offer by P to pay A a
stipulated amount for the performance of a stipulated service." See MECHEM,
OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 38 (1952). Cf. note 19 infra.
2. See LA. CIVIrL CODE arts. 3016-3020 (1870).
3. See, e.g., Dunn v. Spiro, 153 So. 316 (La. App. 1934); Smith v. Blache,
19 La. App. 594, 140 So. 147 (1932) ; Duncan Steele, Inc. v. Labatt, 130 So. 841
(La. App. 1930) ; Fowler v. Phillips, 159 La. 668, 106 So. 26 (1925).
4. See, e.g., Lally v. Dossat, 31 So.2d 41 (La. App. 1947).
5. See, e.g., Doulon v. Babin, 44 So.2d 134 (La. App. 1950) ; Richardson v.
Bradford, 153 La. 725, 96 So. 546 (1923) ; Knotts v. Midkiff, 114 La. 234, 38 So.
153 (1905). Of. Hanemann v. Uhry, 8 La. App. 534 (1928) ; Shaw v. Walker,
43 So.2d 700 (1950).
6. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1764, 1778, 2745 et seq., 2985 et seq. (1870). See
also text at note 163 infra.
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For the purpose of eliminating certain ambiguities, and in
Order to achieve a comprehensible analysis of our law, it may be
useful to define at the very outset of our discussion the words
mandatary, agent, and broker as used in this paper. The word
mandatary, of civilian origin, 7 will be used in connection with
its civilian background and only in its original meaning s under
the Civil Code of Louisiana. It will denote a person having
actual authority to act in a representative capacity for his prin-
cipal according to the terms of a contract granting him such
authority.9
The word agent will have its accepted meaning at common
law.10 An agent is a person having the power to make contracts
or other negotiations of a business nature on behalf of a prin-
cipal and by which the latter is bound." It has been said that
"the distinguishing characteristic of the agent is that he repre-
sents his principal contractually."' 12 Unlike a mandatary under
the French and Louisiana Civil Codes who is supposed to act
always in a representative capacity 13 and in accordance with
powers granted him under a contract, 4 an agent at common law
7. Of. BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 234 (1936); POLLOCK,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT, Appendix E, 702 (1936).
8. The meaning of Article 2985 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 has changed
substantially since the Louisiana Supreme Court announced in the case of Sentell
v. Richardson, 211 La. 288, 298, 29 So.2d 852, 855 (1947), that "our opinion is
that the words 'and in his name' are not essential to the definition of a procuration
or power of attorney, as defined in Art. 2985 of the Civil Code." Cf. Comment, 8
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 409, 414 (1948) ; see text at notes 117, 125-217 infra.
9. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2985 et seq. (1870).
10. Cf. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 3 (8th ed. 1874)
POPESCO-RAMNICEANo, DR LA REPRESENTATION DANS LES ACTES EN DROIT COM-
PARIt 507 et seq. (1927). The terms "representative" and "representation" will be
respectively used with reference to civilian institutions. Cf. CLARISE, DE LA REP-
RESENTATION 11 (1949).
11. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 4 (1952). Cf. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 2d, § 1 (1958) "(1)
Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
of one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act; (2) The one for whom action is to
be taken is the principal; (3) The one who is to act is the agent." See also
Munro, The Agent's Status: The Kidd Case, 20 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 33 (1958).
Agency at common law is an all pervading institution, quite independent from
mandate. It has been observed that the civilian mandate "would be unenforceable
as being without consideration in the common law." POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CON-
TRACT, Appendix E, 749-750 (1921).
12. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 4 (1952).
13. Cf. Miiller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 177 (1957)
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WAHL, TRAITt THEORIQUE ET DROIT CIVIL 173 (1907);
Cass. April 14, 1886, [1887] 8.1.76. But cf. text at notes 53-55 infra.
14. Cf. CLARISE, DE LA REPRESENTATION 13, 55, 87 (1949). The word manda-
tary has thus a muchnarrower meaning than the word "representative." Repre-
sentation must not necessarily rest on contract but it may merely rest on consent,
as common law agency. It may also rest on some rule of law in which case it is
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has powers which derive from a relationship founded on con-
sent 5 or apparent consent 16 and status 17 and which may be exer-
cised even on behalf of an undisclosed principal.'
For the purpose of our discussion a broker may be defined
as a person employed to find a prospect or to show an oppor-
tunity for the conclusion of a transaction. 9 In contrast to both
common law agency and the contract of mandate of our Civil
Code, brokerage as defined does not purport to confer on the
broker authority or power to transact business in his name or
in the name of his principal. It merely authorizes the broker to
try to find a prospect and to negotiate with him; the business
is to be closed between the principal and the prospect. 20 In other
words, the broker, ordinarily, is not employed as a mandatary
or agent, and has no actual or apparent authority to bind his
principal. However, much depends on the particular transac-
tion and on the "internal" relationship between principal and
broker; and brokerage as defined may well coincide with man-
date or agency.21
In the following discussion an attempt will be made to re-
called "legal representation." Cf. Mijiller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. OF
CoMP. L. 165, 168 (1957).
15. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 11 ("Consent is the basis
of authority .... Authority rests on consent rather than contract") ; AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 2d § 15 (1958).
16. SEE MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 54 et seq. (1952).
17. See Munro, The Agent's Status: The Kidd Case, 20 U. OF PIrT. L. REV. 33
(1958).
18. Cf. Miller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 Am. J. CoMP. L. 165, 178 (1957)
(this is "one of the most important contrasts" between common law and civil
law); MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 96 et seq. (1952).
19. Cf. "A broker is a middleman or a negotiator between two parties .... His
principal business is to bring the parties together." Shaw v. Walker, 43 So.2d 700,
703 (La. App. 1950). The 'broker is "an intermediary employed to negotiate a
matter between two parties." Pugh v. Moore, 44 La. Ann. 209, 10 So. 710 (1892) ;
Dumaine and Co. v. Gay, Sullivan and Co., 188 So. 163 (La. App. 1939) ; City of
Lake Charles v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 114 La. 836, 38 So. 578 (1905).
The broker "is employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons
in matters of trade, commerce, and navigation. For [his] services ... a compensa-
tion, commonly styled brokerage is allowed." Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La. Ann. 1343,
1344, 14 So. 241, 243 (1893).
The employment of an intermediary without representative powers is known
practically to all legal systems. Substantial differences, however, exist with regard
to the regulation of the relations between principal, broker, and third parties.
See Kijhnemann in V SCHLEGELRERGEB, RECHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDWSRTER-
DUCH FOR DAS ZIVIL UND HANDELSRECIIT DES IN-UND AUSLANDES 309.
20. See Beal v. M'Kiernan, 6 La. 407, 417 (1834) ("The broker negotiates
the bargain, he carries communications to and from the parties respectively, and
they or their agent, concludes the bargain."). Cf. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW
OF AGENCY 37 (1952). Cf. notes 149, 165, 198 et seq., infra.
21. Cf. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENOY 37-38 (1952); text.at:
notes 122, 129, 149, infra.
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examine the sources of Louisiana law relating to brokerage,
mandate, and agency in their historical perspective; to ascertain
certain similarities and differences between those legal relations;
to test the applicability of the law of agency and mandate to a
simple brokerage contract; and to demonstrate that a distinction
may be conducive to a further rationalization of our law.
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870
moved in this general area of problems raised by mandate, repre-
sentation, and brokerage, within the framework of the French
legal tradition.22 The relevant provisions of our Civil Code could
thus be best understood through a brief historical excursus to
early civilian sources, namely Roman law and French law of the
pre-codification period. A further reference to the French Civil
Code and to modern developments in France and Germany may
illustrate the inherent inadequacies of the eighteenth century
continental legal theory and legislative technique to cope with
the problems arising in a modern industrialized society.
Roman Law
The contract of brokerage, though known as such in both
classical and post-classical Roman law, never became elevated
to an individual contractual form.23 A short individual title in
the Digest regulated the broker's right to a commission which
was called "proxenetika.'' 24 The claim to such a commission,
though considered "degrading," was enforceable by actio.25 In
the absence of agreement for a commission nothing could be
claimed; and where an excessive commission was stipulated, the
courts could reduce it to what was considered to be reasonable
under the circumstances. 26 If such excessive commission had
been already received by the broker, the excess was recoverable
by action which could be instituted by the principal and his heirs
against the broker and his heirs.2 1 Claims between broker and
principal were settled by the Praetors in their "extra-ordinaria
22. Of. text at notes 110, 117, infra.
23. See Sakketas, in III ERM. A.K. (COMMENTARIES ON THE GREEK CIVIL
CODE OF 1.940) under Arts. 703-708 (1955) (in Greek).
24. See DIG. 50: 14, 1-3, De Proxeneticis. Significantly, in the French edition
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 the word broker is translated as "prowrndte."
25. DiG. 50: 14, 3.
26. See DERNBURG, II DAS BORGERLICHE RECHT DES DEUTSCIIEN REICHS UND
PREUSSENS 589 (1915).
27. Of. JUSTINIAN'S CODE 5, 1, 6 relating to "marriage brokers."
780 [Vol. XIX
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cognitio," the same form of process used in the adjudication of
claims resulting from employment for liberal or scientific ser-
vices. 2
8
It seems that brokerage was classified as a contract for work,
and, at times, as a species of mandate.29 It is important to notice,
however, that the Roman law mandate was a materially different
institution from the contract of mandate as regulated in the
Louisiana Civil Code. The broker in Roman law, though perhaps
a "mandatary," was not an "agent" or "representative" of his
principal. 80 Representation as we understand the term today,
namely, direct acquisition of rights and liabilities through con-
tractual action of properly authorized intermediaries, was un-
known to Roman law.3 1 However, several substitute legal devices
were developed in judicial practice which facilitated the trans-
action of business through intermediaries. One of these sub-
stitutes for representation, and perhaps the most important, was
the contract of mandate by which a mandator could authorize
his mandatary to transact one of several affairs for him. 2
Subject matter of the contract was the gratuitous perform-
ance of both juridical and non-juridical acts by the mandatary. 8
The effect of the mandatary's action was limited to the manda-
tary and third parties; the mandator did not assume any obliga-
tions nor did he acquire rights against persons who dealt with
his mandatary.3 4 The mandator had simply an actio mandati
directa against the mandatary to compel him to assign the bene-
fits accruing in his person, and after the assignment took place,
he could bring action against third persons in the name of his
mandatary. The mandatary, on the other hand, had an actio
mandati contraria against the mandator for indemnification.35
In the post-classical Roman law, as to certain matters, the
28. Cf. DIG. 50: 13, 1, §§ 10-12; 50: 14, 3.
29. But cf. DIG. 50: 14, 2.
30. Cf. note 31 infra.
31. See BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 519 (1932); BUCKLAND,
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 168 (1936); CLARISE, DE LA REPRESENTATION
35 (1949) ; POPESCO-RAMNICEANO, DE LA REPRESENTATION DANS LES ACTES JuRi-
DIQUES EN DROIT COMPARit 25, 38, 42 (1927).
32. See BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 168, 234 (1936);. Po-
PESCO-RAMNICEANO, DE LA REPRESENTATION DANS LES A CTES JURIDIQUES EN
DROIT COMPARt 42 (1927).
33. See 2 DE COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CivIL LAW 82 (1853).
34. See CLARISE, DE LA REPRESENTATION 36 (1949) ; BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK
OF ROMAN LAW 519 (1932).
35. See BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 234 (1936); POPESCO-
RAMNICEANO, DE LA REPRESENTATION DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES EN DROIT
CoMPARA 44 (1927).
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mandator had an actio utilis against third persons; similarly,
third persons could hold the mandator directly liable by an actio
ins8titutoria or ad exemplum institutoriae.36 Thus, it was only at
the end of its historical evolution that Roman law came very
close to the idea of representation through mandate, but it never
developed a general institution resembling our all-pervading con-
cept of agency.
Whether or not distinction was made as to brokers, we lack
precise information. At any rate, it is hard to imagine that
brokers as such, and without more, were vested with representa-
tive capacity under the Roman law of the post-classical period
though they might still be regarded as "mandataries." This as-
sumption seems to be particularly justified in view of the gen-
eral hesitancy of Roman law to recognize representation even
where this would be in accord with the intention of the principal
and his express grant of authority.
France
The French Civil Code did not expressly regulate the con-
tract of brokerage.8 7 The French Commercial Code and special
laws subsequently enacted,8 8 regulated what may be described as
"commercial brokerage. '3 9 The "civil" contract of brokerage
(which in France includes the activities of a real estate broker) 40
being thus an "innominate" contract 4' under the Civil Code was
36. See BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 519 (1932); BUCKLAND,
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 234 (1936); DE COLQUHOUN, 11 A SUMMARY OF
THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW 91. (1853).
37. The French Civil Code does not contain provisions corresponding to Articles
3016-3020 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Transaction of business, however, is facili-
tated in France through the services of several kinds of intermediaries known as
"Agents d'affaires" (Cf. II PLANIOL-RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
'FRANCAiS 869 (1952), hereinafter cited PLANIOL-RIPERT) ; "Courtier" (Cf. XI
PLANIOL-RIPERT 851; ESCARRA-RAULT, II TRAITb THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL 135 et seq. (1955), hereinafter cited ESCARRA-RAULT) ; "Com-
missionaire" (Cf. II ESCARRA-RAULT 56 et seq.) ; "Pr6tenom" (cf. XI PLANIOL-
RIPERT 956).38. See CODE DE COMMERCE arts. 71-108 (1807) (annotated ed. Dalloz 1957)
II ESCARRA-RAULT, 135 et seq. (1955).
39.. Of. ESCARRA, CouRs DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 21, 54, 79 (1952).
40. Cf. id. at 73, 78, 86; MIGNAULT, DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 81 (1909);
PERAULT, DROIT COMMERCIAL 307 (1936) (Quebec).
41. In civil law countries, -distinction is commonly made between "nominate"
and "innominate" contracts. See ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, LEHRBUCH DES BOROER-
LICHEN 'RECHTS, II SCHULDRECHT 381 et seq. (1954) ; 2 LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES
-SCHULDRECHTS 1 et 8eq. (1956); 3 RIPERT-BOULANOER, TRA1TA DE DROIT CIVIL
437 et seq. (1958) ; II A ERM. A.K. (COMMENTARIES ON THE GREEK CIVIL CODE)
357 et seq. (1949). The first are contracts specifically regulated by the civil codes
in force, and as to them, the general principles applicable to all contracts are
merely supplemental; the specific regulation prevails over the general provisions.
[Vol. XIX
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classified by the courts and writers either as a contract for work
or as a mandate according to the Roman law tradition.
42
The result was confusion, reflected in a body of inconsistent
and contradictory case law. The Roman jurists could, perhaps,
consistently with their conception of mandate, classify brokerage
as a species of that contract. But in France mandate had become
synonymous with representative agency 43 and once the broker
was termed a mandatary the courts could, perhaps with good
reason, ask themselves whether the broker had the power to
represent his principal and whether several other rules applicable
to mandate were also applicable to the contract of brokerage.
Indeed, already by the sixteenth century, the notion of rep-
resentation was infused into the old contract of mandate through
the canon law maxim "qui facit per alium facit per se. '' 44 At that
time it became clear that the mandatary is nothing more than an
intermediary acting on account of his mandator who alone is
liable to third parties.45 Pothier was unequivocal in that regard
46
while remnants of the old hesitancy to recognize representation
still persisted in Domat,47 who insisted that ratification of the
acts of the mandatary by the mandator was a prerequisite for
allowing direct action by or against the mandator.
The redactors of the French Civil Code did not construct a
general institution of agency, distinguished from the contract
of mandate or from other venerable civilian institutions serving
as substitutes for agency.48 Particularly, following a century-old
tradition, they dealt with all problems of representation under
The second category of contracts is primarily subject to the general principles, and,
by analogy, to rules governing nominate contracts, "adapted to the nature" of the
innominate contract under consideration. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1764 (1870).
42. See e.g., Cass. Feb. 9, 1938, [1938] II J.C.P. 744; Riom Ct. of App., Nov.
6, 1931, [1932] 1 Gaz. Pal. 325; Cass. June 14, 1932 [1932] 2 Gaz. Pal. 480;
Cass. March 1, 1932, [1932] 1 Gaz. Pal. 780; Comm. Ct. of Fecamp, June 29,
1949, [1949] 2 Gaz. Pal. 182. Cf. Cass. Jan. 20, 1931, [1931] D.-. 115.
43. See text at notes 48-51 infra.
44. See POPESCO-RAMNICEANO, DE LA REPRESENTATION DANS LES ACTES JURI-
DIQUES EN DROIT COMPAR ' 185 (1927), hereinafter cited POPESCO-RA3,iNICEANO.
45. Id. at 187.
46. See 5 OEUVRES DE POTHIER 207 (ed. Bugnet 1831).
47. Cf. POPESCO-RAMNICEANo at 188. According to Domat mandate could be
given, as in Roman law, for both juridical and non-juridical acts. See DOMAT, LES
LOIS CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL; LE LIv. I, tit. XV, I, 153 (1777).
48. See Miiller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 171 (1957).
It seems that the principle of the personal character of contractual obligations
created a dogmatic obstacle for an outright recognition of representation. See LA.
CIVIL CODE arts. 1119, 1165 (1870) ; VI PLANIOL-RIPERT 60; PopEsco-RAMNI-
CEANO 200.
784 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
the title on mandate.49 According to Article 1984 of the Civil
Code "a mandate or procuration is an act by which one person
gives to another the power to do something for the mandator
and in his name."5 0 This definition, which confuses mandate,
procuration, and representation,;" has been strongly criticized
as meaningless and misleading 2 and, gradually, it became ap-
parent that it did not accurately describe the actual state of the
law. According to the prevailing view in France today, mandate
and representation are two different things which may or may
not coincide. 3 Thus, there can be mandate without represen-
tation5 4 and representation without mandate.55 These two dis-
tinct legal concepts have been described as two intersecting
circles.5 6 Further, the majority view of courts and writers is
49. See Miiller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. CoMP. L. 165, 171 (1957).
50. Art. 1984. "Le mandat ou procuration est un act par lecquel une personne
donne 4 une autre Ic pouvoir de faire quelque chose pour le mandant et en son
nom."
51. See DALLOZ, ENCYCLOPEDIE JURIDIQUE, III REPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
318 et seq. (1953). Procuration is the power given by the mandator to the man-
datary, or the instrument establishing a mandate. It is a unilateral act which
need not be accepted. Mandate is a contract conferring power of representation.
In other words, procuration is one of the effects of mandate. See 11 PLANIO.-
RIPERT 851, 852; POPEscO-RAMNICEANO 224. Actually, it seems that Article 1984
defines procuration rather than mandate. See 6 AUBRY ET RAU, TRAITP DE DROIT
CIVIL 153, n. 2 (5th ed. 1920) ; 11 PLANIOL-RIPERT 851.
52. A literal interpretation should lead to the conclusion that (1) mandate may
Oe given for both juridical and non-juridical acts (but ef. infra note 57) ; (2) there
can be no mandate without representation, namely, that the mandatary should
always act in the name of his principal (but cf. infra notes 54-55) ; and (3) that
the word mandate is synonymous with procuration (but cf. supra note 51).
53. See 6 PLANIOL-RIPERT 62; 11 at 851; CLARISE, DE LA REPRESENTATION
87 (1949) ("The two concepts, even where they coincide, describe two substantially
different aspects of the same transaction. Mandate points to the internal relations
between two persons - the mandator and the mandatary. Representation on the
other hand points to the external aspects of the transaction, the relations of prin-
cipal and agent toward third parties.") The French doctrine was apparently
influenced by Laband, Die Stellvertretung nach dem Deutschen H.G.B., [1866]
ZEISCIeRIFT FCR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECIIT 204. See POPESco-RAMNICEANO
228. According to a view previously prevailing in France, there could be no man-
date without representation. See Cass. April 14, 1886, [1886] D.1.220, S.1.76;
Cass. Nov. 13, 1934, [1935] 8.1.60; 6 AUBRY ET RAU, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL 155
(1920). Cf. CLARISE, DE LA REPRESENTATION 87 (1949) ; 11 PLANIOL-RIPERT 851.
The confusion between mandate and representation has been explained as due in
part to the need of a distinction between mandate and employment. In Roman
law mandate was distinguishable from employment in that the former involved
performance of services gratuitously while the latter for compensation. In France
the distinction was thought to be found in the idea of representation. See POPESCo-
RAMNICEANo 228.
54. E.g., "Pr~te-nom" (mandatary conducting business in his own name)
"commissionaire" (commercial mandate without representation). See CLARISE, DE
LA REPRESENTATION 88 (1949) ; 6 PLANIOL-RIPERT 62; 11 at 851; PopEsco-RAM-
NICEANO 228.
55. "Legal representation"; "negotiorum gestio": see POPESCO-RAMNICEANO
228; REPERTOIRE DALLOZ, supra note 51, at 318, § 4; 11 PLANIOL-RIPERT 851; 6
at 62.
56. Cf. POPESCO-RAMNICEANO 234; LEONHARD, DER ALGEMEINE THEIL DES
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that only juridical acts may be the subject matter of a mandate ;57
acts of a non-juridical nature may be the subject of a contract
of employment or for work.58 Accordingly, mandate has been
scientifically defined as a contract by which one person (man-
dator) gives to another (mandatary) the power to accomplish
on his behalf one or more juridical acts. 59
Thus, it has been established that the broker is not always
a mandatary and the brokerage contract, whether commercial
or civil, is not always a mandate. The broker is a mandatary
only where he has express actual authority to conclude juridical
acts on behalf of his principal.60 The courts, however, are still
at times inclined to regard the broker as a mandatary even where
he merely brings the parties together and does not interfere with
them as to the actual formation of the contract to conclude the
transaction.6 1 The attitude of the courts in such cases has been
rationalized by Professor Planiol as a device permitting reduc-
tion of excessive commissions by judicial intervention- which
would not be otherwise permissible.
62
Germany
In Germany, and in several continental countries which share
the German legal tradition, clear-cut distinction is made between
mandate and brokerage,63 and the two are further distinguished
from both representative and non-representative agency, 64 and
from the contract of employment. 65 Thus, free from conceptual
BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCiiS 315 (1900).
57. See 11 PLANIOL-RIPERT 851; REPERTOIRE DALLOZ, supra note 51, at 318,
§ 2; Cass. Oct. 24, 1928, [1928] Gaz. Pal. 179. Of. POPESCO-RAMNICEANO 229.
58. See REPERTOIRE DALLOZ, supra note 51, at 319, § 18.
59. See 11 PLANIOL-RIPERT 851..
60. See 12 BEUDANT-LEREBOURS-PIGONNI kRE, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
332 (1947); Letarte, Problemes juridiques de l'agent d'immeubles, 9 REVUE DU
BARREAU 105, 107 (1949) ; REPERTOIRE DALLOZ, supra note 51, at 322, § 44. Cf.
ESCARRA, COURS DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 80 (1952).
61. See 11 PLANIOL-RIPERT 869.
62. Ibid.
63. See German B.G.B. §§ 662-676 (mandate) ; §§ 652-656 (brokerage). Swiss
Code of Obligations, Arts. 394-406 (mandate) ; Arts. 412-418 (brokerage). Greek
Civil Code, Arts. 713-729 (mandate) ; Arts. 703-708 (brokerage). See also 3
STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUIm BtRGERLICiEN GESETZBUCII, II RECHT DER
SCHULDVERHALTNISSE 1809 (1958), hereinafter cited STAUDINGER.
64. See German B.G.B. §§ 164-181 (representation) ; §§ 677-687 (negotiorum
gestio). Swiss Code of Obligations, Arts. 32-40 (representation); Arts. 419-424
(negotiorum gestio). Greek Civil Code, Arts. 211-234 (representation); Arts.
730-740 (negotiorum gestio). See also II 3 STAUDINGER 1809; Miiller-Freienfels,
Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 172 (1957).
65. See German B.G.B. §§ 611 et seq.; Swiss CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 319
et seq.; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 648 et seq. See also II 3 STAUDINGER 1809;
LARENZ, II LEHRBUCHI DES SCHULDRECUTS 187 (1956), hereinafter cited LARENZ.
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difficulties and confused analysis, the regulation of the contract
of brokerage in Germany may serve as an illustration of modern
civilian legislative technique.
Conceptual foundation: civil and commercial brokerage. De-
pending on the nature and object of the contemplated trans-
action, brokerage in Germany may be a "civil" or a "commercial"
contract. The former is regulated by the Civil Code and the latter
by the Commercial Code and other special laws.6 The Commer-
cial Code deals in general with the rights and obligations of
commercial brokers."' Such brokers are professional business-
men who undertake the negotiation of contracts on behalf of
third parties without entering into a permanent legal relation
with them. 68 Real estate, and real estate transactions in general,
are not objects of commerce; accordingly, the activities of real
estate brokers, as well as all other contracts of a non-commercial
nature, are regulated by the Civil Code.69
The regulation of the brokerage contract by the Civil Code
is not exhaustive. The Code establishes only the conceptual
foundations of civil brokerage and regulates the broker's right
to a commission. Several questions, such as what is the effect
of the broker's or the principal's death, and whether or not the
contract may be cancelled, are to be answered according to the
general provisions of the Code relating to juridical acts, and
according to the general principles of the law of contract and
obligations. 70 Usages, and the principle of good faith, may also
supplement the agreement of the parties and the discharge of
their mutual obligations.
The Civil Code defines brokerage as an agreement whereby
In the framework of German civil law, brokerage belongs to the category of con-
tracts involving performance of services in the employment or for the interest of
another, but it is clearly distinguished from both the contract of employment and
the contract for work. However, as all these legal relations are to a large extent
similar, the rules applicable to the latter two contracts may in case of doubt apply
to brokerage by analogy. See II 3 STAUDINGFR 1809.
66. See in general II 3 STAUDINGER 1806 et 8eq.; ENNECCERUfS-LEHMANN,
LEHRBUCH DES BGRGERLICHEN RECHTS, II SCHULDRECIT 648 (1954), hereinafter
cited ENNECCERus-LEHMANN.
67. See H.G.B. § 93-104; II 3 STAUDINGER 1810; II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN
648.
68. See H.G.B. § 92; II 3 STAUDINGER 1810. Commercial brokers are distin-
guished from the so-called commercial agents. See STAUDINGER id. 1811.
69. See II 3 STAUDINGER 1813; II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 648.
70. As legislative regulation is scanty, a body of case law has emerged with its
attention focused on the mhtual obligations of the parties and on the requirement
of causal connection between the services of the broker and the conclusion of the
transaction. See II 3 STAUDINOER 1807.
[Vol. XIX
1959] BROKERAGE, MANDATE, AND AGENCY 787
"one promises to another a commission for showing an oppor-
tunity or acting as an intermediary in the conclusion of a con-
tract."'71 As freedom of contract prevails in Germany, the par-
ties are free to shape their agreement according to their desires,
and brokerage may assume several forms. 72 The simple broker-
age contract regulated by the Code is an informal, consensual
agreement, unilateral in nature.7 3 The principal offers a com-
mission in exchange for the services of the broker. The broker
is not obliged to render services or to conclude a bargain; if such
an obligation is undertaken the contract is one of employment
or for work and the rules regulating such contracts are repec-
tively applicable.7 4
Mutual rights and obligations. According to the Civil Code,
the principal undertakes the obligation to pay the stipulated
commission upon the conclusion of the contemplated transac-
tion with a prospect procured by the broker.75  His obligation is
conditional, depending on the conclusion of the bargain "as a
result of" the broker's activity.7 6 The principal is under no obli-
gation to conclude a contract and he is free to find himself a
customer or to employ other brokers.77 The broker in such a case
has no claim for a commission, nor is he entitled in absence of
71. See B.G.B. § 652; II ENNECCERUs-LERMANN 646.
72. Thus brokerage may be: (i) a unilateral contract (where the broker is
under no obligation to try to find a prospect, but where the conclusion of the con-
templated transaction by his principal gives rise to the broker's claim for com-
pensation) ; (ii) a bilateral contract (where the broker undertakes the obligation
to try to find a prospect, to show an opportunity, or to mediate in the conclusion
of a transaction). As the broker is under obligation to render services rather than
achieve a result, the contract approximates employment, and the relevant articles
of the Code may be applicable by analogy; and (iii) a not-so-frequent arrange-
ment whereby the broker guarantees that a contract, according to specified terms,
will be concluded between his principal and a third party. In such a case the
legal relation created approximates the notion of a contract for work, and the
articles of the Civil Code relating to that contract may be respectively applicable.
See II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 647.
73. See II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 649, 646, n. 2, 650; II 3 STAIUDINGER 1807.
74. See supra note 72.
75. See B.G.B. § 652. It is not necessary that the commission be expressed in
terms of money; it may consist of other commodities, See B.G.B. § 652.1; II ER-
NECCERUS-LEHMANN 647, 650. There can be no claim for commission in "mar-
riage" brokerage. B.G.B. § 656 I 1. However, where such commission is paid, it
cannot be recovered. See II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 654. Any disproportionate
and excessive commission may be reduced by the court to a "reasonable" amount.
B.G.B. § 655; II ENNFCcFus-LEHMANN 653.
76. The burden of proof as to the causal connection rests on the broker. Knowl-
edge by the principal that the transaction was the result of the broker's efforts is
not essential. See II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 652.
77. See II ENNECCERUs-LEHMANN 653; 101 R.G.Z. 211 (1921). As to prob-
lems connected with the employment of more than one broker, see II 3 STAUDIN-
GER 1815.
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contrary agreement to reimbursement for expenses. 78 According
to the Code, a commission is "impliedly stipulated where under
the circumstances the broker is expected to act for remunera-
tion." 79 The quantum of the commission in such a case is to be
determined according to the official rate and in absence of such
regulation according to local usage. s0
Distinction is ordinarily made between a broker undertaking
to show an opportunity for the conclusion of a transaction and
a broker employed to negotiate a contract. The broker in the
first case may validly agree on receiving a commission from both
parties, while in the second case it is debatable whether the
broker has such a right."' The commercial broker may in all
cases so contract as to claim commission from both parties and
in absence of contrary agreement he is entitled to claim half
of his commission from each party.8 2 The commercial broker is
an impartial third person who must serve the interests of both
parties and who undertakes obligations of a fiduciary nature
toward both of them. 3 On the contrary, the civil broker em-
ployed as a negotiator acts only on behalf of his principal with
whom alone he is tied with a contractual relation. He is not
permitted to take into account the interests of the other party
and he is expected to secure the best possible bargain for his
principal; if he acts for the other party he loses his right to a
commission.8 4
Even where the broker undertakes no obligation to act, he
is bound by certain obligations resulting from the principle of
good faith and he is held to a certain standard of conduct. He is
obliged to conduct the entrusted business in good faith, to pro-
mote the interests of his principal, and to protect him from pos-
sible losses.8 5 He must at once notify the principal with regard
78. Contrary agreement, however, is lawful. See B.G.B. § 652 II; II EN-
NECCERus-LEJIMANN 652.
79. B.G.B. § 653 I; II ENNECCERUS-LE]HMANN 648. An implied agreement to
pay a commission exists even where services rendered by a "volunteer" broker and
resulting to the principal's benefit are received by the latter without objection. A
false impression that no commission will be claimed cannot relieve the principal
from his obligation. See 95 R.G.Z. 137; 34 H.R.R. No. 897; ENNECCERUS-LE -
MANN, ibid.
80. B.G.B. § 653 II. See also II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 648.
81. Of. II ENNECCEBUS-LEHIMANN 652; II LAuENZ 188.
82. H.G.B. § 99. See also II ENNECCERus-LEHMANN 650.
83. H.G.B. § 98.
84. B.G.B. § 654. See also II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 650. The third party
stands in no contractual relationship with the broker even where the broker's
services result to the benefit of that party. See B.G.B. § 653 II; [1921] R.G.J.
W. 1314; O.L.G. Frankfurt, [1952] N.J.W. 226.
85. See II ENNECCERus-LEHMANN 649. The broker may delegate his authority
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to all doubts or reservations he may have concerning the person
of the prospect, the quality of the object of the transaction, and
any other aspects capable of producing loss. In all cases he
should act according to the directions of his principal. 86 The
principal, on the other hand, is under an obligation to inform
the broker that the transaction is concluded, whether or not as a
result of the broker's activity, so that unnecessary efforts may
be avoided.8 7
Termination of the contract. The principal may withdraw
from the contract of brokerage at any time, provided that he
undertook no contrary obligation to continue the contract for a
specified period of time.8 8 However, even in the latter case, he
has the right to withdraw for good and just cause, as where his
confidence in the broker is shaken.8 9 Cancellation and with-
drawal from the contract relate to the future only; the broker
will in such cases have a right to compensation for past services;
and if a transaction is concluded between the principal and a
prospect introduced by the broker, or where the conclusion of
the transaction is made impossible by the principal, the broker
earns his full commission. 0
The broker may also cancel the contract at any time, pro-
vided that he did not undertake an obligation to act. Where
such an obligation is undertaken, cancellation is permissible only
for just and good reasons; if no such reason exists, the broker
is liable to pay damages.9 1
The right to cancel the contract may be limited by contrary
agreement. The validity of such a clause is the subject of much
conflict of opinion and seems to depend on the circumstances of
each case. In cases of doubt it may be interpreted as creating an
obligation for the principal to pay the commission whether the
customer is found by another broker or by the principal himself.
to a sub-broker, unless this is excluded by contract. In any case the broker will
be liable for the faults of the sub-broker.
86. See LARENZ 189.
87. See II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 653.
88. See II ENNECCERUs-LEHMANN 653.
89. See II LARENZ 189.
90. Where the conclusion of the contemplated transaction is made impossible
by the principal acting in bad faith, the broker nevertheless earns his commission.
See II ENNECCERUS-LEIMANN 653; B.G.B. § 162 I. Such is the case where "list-
ing" is made for a limited period of time and the principal concludes the transac-
tion with a prospect introduced by the broker after the expiration of the listing,
See II ENNECCERus-LEHMANN, ibid.
91. Of. B.G.B. § 626, 627; LARENZ 189.
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The broker must prove that the conclusion of a transaction ac-
cording to the terms of the contract was possible, but was made
impossible by the principal's conduct. The principal is protected
from abuse by inserting into the contract a provision for termi-
nation of the contract. In absence of such provision, the cus-
tomary deadline of the trade will be controlling and the principal
will be able in any case to cancel the contract according to the
provision of the Code regulating cancellation of unrevocable
contracts.
92
Whether or not the death of the principal terminates the
contract of brokerage depends on the circumstances of each case.
The death of the broker is less significant, particularly where
the principal is dealing with a firm rather than with individ-
uals.93
COMMON LAW
Along with her civilian heritage, Louisiana has for more than
a century-and-a-half shared the common law tradition of her
sister-states. In matters of commercial law in general, Louisiana
has taken decisive steps to make her law uniform with that
of sister-states 94 though that rapprochement was frequently
achieved at the expense of highly valued civilian institutions.
Accordingly, it may be of interest to summarize at this point the
common law approach to problems of agency and brokerage,
particularly in view of the fact that common law notions have
been frequently utilized in the interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Louisiana Civil CodeY5
At common law, brokers 6 in general are considered as agents
of the first person who employs them, and, under exceptional
circumstances, as agents of both parties to a transaction con-
92. See B.G.B. § 626 ff.; II ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 653.
93. See II ENNECCERUS-LEIMANN 654.
94. See Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Re-appraised, 11 TUL. L. REV. 585,
592 et seq. (1937). Cf. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert, McMahon, A Reappraisal Ap-
praised: A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937).
95. Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 499 (1925)
("the rules of agency are largely the same under our Code as they are in the
commercial law"). Cf. text at notes 120, 125, infra.
96. According to Professor Mechem, a broker is a person "whose occupation it
is to bring parties together to bargain, or to bargain for them, in matters of trade,
commerce or navigation." See MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 1935
(2d ed. 1914). Cf. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 33 (8th ed.
1874) "[A] broker ... is an agent, employed to make bargains and contracts be-
tween other persons, in matters of trade, commerce, or navigation, for a compensa-
tion, commonly called brokerage." Cf. supra note 19.
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cluded through their efforts. 97 However, doubts have been raised
with regard to the status of certain brokers. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that a real estate broker "barely qualifies as
being technically an agent at all; his real position is more that
of one to whom an offer is made which the broker tries to accept.
The offer is to pay a commission (usually of specified amount)
on the performance of a certain service, viz., finding for the
offeror (client) a person who is ready, able and willing to buy
the offeror's property on the terms which he has named to the
broker."98 The Restatement of the Law of Agency regards all
brokers as agents ;99 yet, the definition given to the word agent 0 0
and the enumeration of essentials of the agbnt-principal relation-
ship do not bear out a clear conclusion that the broker is an
agent.' 0 ' Most important, perhaps, the broker as such does not
have the power to bind his principal at common law ;102 and there
is room for argument that the broker is an agent only in the
sense that he owes fiduciary obligations toward his principal. 10 3
Be that as it may, it is clear that not all agents are brokers. 0 4
Thus, while the rules of agency apply in principle to the relations
among brokers, principals, and third parties, at the same time
there is a distinct body of case law that applies to brokers
alone. 05 According to this analysis, brokerage and agency must
be described graphically as two concentric circles, the broader
of which represents agency and the narrower brokerage.
At common law, perhaps, there is no such thing as a "broker-
97. See STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY, 34, 36 (8th ed. 1874).
98. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 388 (1952). See also id. at 37.
99. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 2d
§ I(d) (1958).
100. Cf. supra note 11.
101. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
2d § 12 (1958) : "An agent or apparent agent holds a power to alter the legal
relations between the principal and third persons and between the principal and
himself." (Emphasis added.)
102. Cf. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF.AGENCY 38 (1952) ("It comes
very close to being no agency at all . . . probably a modicum of authority");
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 33, 36 (8th ed. 1874) ("Properly
speaking, a broker is a mere negotiator between the other parties . . . . [A]s a
middleman, he is not intrusted to fix the terms but merely to interpret (as it is
sometimes phrased) between the principals.")
103. Of. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 33, 36 (8th ed. 1874).
104. See Stratford v. Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619, 625, 20 So. 127, 128 (1895)
("Every broker is, in a sense, an agent; but every agent is not a 'broker. There
are, however, so many incidents common to both relations that it is difficult to
define the precise line of demarcation.")
105. Cf. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 52 (delegation of au-
thority) ; 8, 389 (capacity of an agent, licensing of brokers) ; 11, 389 (formali-
ties) ; 347 (double agency) (1952).
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age contract" in the abstract, but merely several kinds of brokers
and several kinds of brokerage contracts. 10 6 Consequently, gen-
eralizations are misleading. Where the parties do not exercise
proper care to prescribe their mutual rights and obligations, the
applicable rules may differ with the kind of the contemplated
transaction and with the type of the broker's activity. The
analysis of broker's rights and obligations at common law has
been the subject of elaborate treatises and of numerous law re-
view articles so that any repetition here would be superfluous.1°7
LOUISIANA
The Civil Code and Judicial Practice in General
a. In contrast to the Code Napoleon, in the Civil Code of
Louisiana brokerage is a "nominate" contract. 0 8 Articles 3016-
3020 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870, speaking "of the man-
datary or agent of both parties," regulate some important as-
pects of the brokerage contract. The source of these provisions
which were first adopted in the Civil Code of 1825,109 is not
officially known; yet, it seems reasonable to assume that they
were taken from the text of Domat, which is reproduced almost
verbatim in the French edition." 0
106. Cf. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 37 ff. (8th ed. 1874)
MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 1936 et seq. (2d ed. 1914).
107. See e.g., MECHEm, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 1935 ff. (1914);
Finkelstein, The Case of the Broker's Commission, 28 ST. JOHN'S LAW REV. 220
(1954) ; Perrin, What Performance Entitles a Real Estate Broker to Commis-
sion: The New York Law, 23 YALE L. J. 339 (1914); Comments, Virginia
Brokerage Contracts, 43 VA. L. REV. 775 (1957) ; Some Aspects of the Real Estate
Brokerage Contract, 22 BROOKLYN L. REV. 65 (1956) ; Rights and Liabilities of
Real Estate Brokers in Tennessee, 23 TENN. L. REV. 1105 (1955) Real Estate
Brokerage in Louisiana, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 820 (1957); Recovery on
Oral Real Estate Broker's Contracts, 31 So. CAL. L. REV. 425 (1958).
108. Cf. supra note 41.
109. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2985-2989 (1825) ; Projet, pp. 350-351, adopted
without comment. There are no corresponding articles in the Civil Code of 1808.
All articles have been cited by the courts on numerous occasions.
110. See DOMAT, LES LOIS CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL; LE DROIT
PUBLIC, ET LEGUM DELECTUS, Paris 1777, Liv. I TIT. XVII, p. 162: "Des
Prodntes ou Entremetteurs: Section 1, 1 L'engagement d'un Entremetteur est
semblable f celui d'un Procureur constitu d'un commis, ou autre proposA, avec
cette difference, que 'Entremetteur 6tant employ6 par des personnes qui m~nagent
des intr ts opposes, il est comme commis de l'un & de l'autre, pour negocier le
commerce, ou 'affaire dont il s' entremet. Ainsi, son engagement est double, &
consiste d conserver envers toutes les parties ]a fidelit6 dans ]'execution de ce que
chacun vent lui confier. Et son pouvoir n'est pas de traiter, mais d'expliquer les
in ention de part & d'autre, & de negocier pour mottre ceux qui 'emploient en 6tat
de traiter eux mmes."
"II Les Entremetteurs ne sont pas responsables des 4venemens des affaires
dont ils d'entremettent, si ce n'est qu'il y efit du dol de leur part, on quelque
faute qui pfit leur Atre imput~e, & ils ne sont pas non plus garans de l'insolvabilit6
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In general, the Code gives a definition to the word broker,
imposes on that person a fiduciary duty toward both parties to a
transaction, 'relieves him from liability for warranties, and refers
to the contract of mandate with regard to all other matters.
According to the Code, a broker is the person "employed to ne-
gotiate a matter between two parties, and who for that reason,
is considered as the mandatary of both."1 1' The Code further
declares that "the obligations of a broker are similar to those of
an ordinary mandatary, with this difference, that his engage-
ment is double, and requires that he should observe the same
fidelity towards all parties, and not favor one more than an-
other."'1 12 As other agents, brokers are "answerable for fraud
or faults," but "they are not responsible for events which arise
in the affairs in which they are employed." 113 And, except in
case of fraud, "they are not answerable for the insolvency of
those to whom they procure sales or loans," "although they re-
ceive a reward for their agency and speak in favor of him who
buys or borrows.""1
4
Thus, following in the main the analysis of Domat, and per-
haps, in accord with oncoming common law notions, 1 5 the broker
has been designated by the Louisiana Civil Code as a common
agent or a mandatary of both parties to a transaction. Yet, as
we have seen,"" when Domat was classifying the broker as a
mandatary he had in mind the Roman law contract of mandate
rather than the subsequently developed institution of represen-
tative agency through mandate. When the language of Domat
was reproduced in the Civil Code in an entirely new context an
analytical difficulty was created, since the Roman law mandate
de ceux a qui ils sont prfter de l'argent ou autre chose, quoique ils regoivent un
salaire de leur entremise, & qu'ils parlent en faveur de celui qui emprunte; si ce
n'est qu'il y efit, on une convention expresse qui les rendit garans de leur fait,
on du dol de leur part.
"Section II, II. "Si l'entremise n'est pas gratuite, celui qui a employ4 un
Entremetteur Iui doit un salaire, on tel qui'il a W convenu ou selon qu'il est
reglM. . . . un salaire proportionn6 a la qualit6 du commerce au autre affaire."
111. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3016 (1870).
112. Id. art. 3017.
113. Id. art. 3018.
114. Id. art. 2019. The following Article 3020 provides that "Commercial and
money brokers, besides the obligations which they incur in common with other
agents, have their duties prescribed by the laws regulating commerce." It seems
then that the preceding three articles were apparently intended to regulate mainly
"civil" brokerage and were adopted in view of the pending introduction of the
(draft) Louisiana Commercial Code.
115. See LIVERMoRE, A TREATISE ON TnE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 73
et seq. (1818) ; STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 33, 36 (8th ed.
1874), first published in 1839. Cf. cases infra note 120.
116. Cf. supra text at note 47.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
had already become synonymous with the representative agency
and the mandatary was simply a representative of his principal.
Indeed, the Louisiana Civil Code has defined mandate as "an
act by which one person gives the power to another to transact
for him and in his name, one or several affairs. ' 117 Thus, classi-
fying the broker as a mandatary would imply that the broker
has authority to bind his principal in contractual transactions,
which, at least with regard to certain kinds of brokerage, would
be contrary to the everyday practice. 18 Apart from the problem
of authority, if brokerage were a mandate it should be regulated
exclusively by the articles on mandate. It seems that this ap-
proach would be inadequate to cope with the exigencies of a
modern commercial society. In that regard, what happened in
both civilian and common law jurisdictions is indicative. In Ger-
many, for example, brokerage has been given detailed regulation
in the Civil and Commercial Codes as well as in special laws. In
France, "civil" brokerage has emerged as a sui generis contract
distinguished from mandate, and the "commercial" brokerage
has been regulated by the Commercial Code and by special laws.
And in common law jurisdictions specific rules have evolved ap-
plicable to brokerage contracts only.119
The inadequacy of the code articles on mandate to cover
brokerage in an efficient way was early felt in Louisiana, and
the Code was supplemented by reference to common law rules
relating to brokerage contracts.2 0 In addition, special acts were
passed regulating the activities of stockbrokers, factors, and real
estate brokers.'2 1 The articles on mandate continued to apply
only insofar as they were not inconsistent with the interests of
the parties, or where brokerage coincided with mandate.2 2 As
117. LA. CIviL CODE art. 2985 (1870). Corresponding Art. 2954 in the Code
of 1825 reads as follows: "A procuration or letter of attorney is an act by which
one person gives power to another to transact for him and in his name, one or
several affairs." The Civil Code of 1808, p. 420, Art. 1 reads as Art. 2954 of the
1825 Code though in the English translation the words "and in his name" are
omitted.
118. See e.g., Dey v. Nelkin, 131 La. 154, 59 So. 104 (1912) ; text at notes
149, 198-200, infra.
119. Cf. text at notes 63-93, 38-62, 96-107, supra.
120. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Trott, 3 La. Ann. 671 (1848) (Custom of London
and Law Merchant) ; Woods v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880) ; Tete v. Lanaux,
45 La. Ann. 1343, 14 So. 241 (1893) ; Taylor v. Martin, 109 La. 137, 33 So. 112
(1902). Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 499 (1925).
121. See e.g., LA. R.S. 37:1431 et seq. (real estate brokers) ; id. 3:500 (cotton
brokers) ; id. 9:4343; 47:349 (factors) ; id. 22:1161; 22:1178 (insurance agents
and brokers) ; id. 47:347, 51:705 (securities' brokers) (1950).
122. Cf. text at notes 149-162, 186-191, infra.
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a result, it may be justifiable to conclude that for all practical
purposes, brokerage has become in Louisiana a contract clearly
distinguished from mandate as defined in Article 2985 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
b. In the course of the years, additional difficulties were
created by a gradual extension of the concept of mandate. Fol-
lowing the civilian tradition of the eighteenth century, and par-
ticularly French doctrine, the Louisiana Civil Code did not de-
velop a general institution of agency or of representation.
23
The inadequacies of such regulation and legislative technique
were amply demonstrated in France. 2 4 In contrast to France,
however, the deficiencies of the system were cured in Louisiana
by early adoption of common law agency notions rather than
reference to subsequent developments in other civilian coun-
tries. 25 Thus, the civilian conception of representative agency
founded on the contract of mandate was extended by the Lou-
isiana courts and to as yet an undetermined extent was made
synonymous with the common law notion of agency.
1.2
Since the mandate of our Civil Code has been fused with
common law agency and the terms mandatary and agent have
been used interchangeably to designate a common law agent,
127
the analytical difficulty created by the code sections classifying
the broker as an agent or mandatary has become even more com-
plicated. We do not know whether the broker is a mandatary in
the sense that he has express actual authority to bind his prin-
cipal in contractual transactions, or whether he may have even
apparent authority to act in a non-representative capacity for
123. Cf. text at notes 48-50, supra.
124. Cf. text at notes 54-59, supra.
125. See e.g. Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 22 (La. 1828) ("When
goods are sold to an agent for an unknown principal, the latter will be liable, when
discovered, although no inquiry was made by the vendor, unless the latter let the
day of payment go by, without making a demand on the principal, who afterwards
pays the agent") ; Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 409, 414 (1948) ("Our
jurisprudence decided the issue of liability between principal and third party in
non-representative agency cases in conformity with Anglo-American rather than
civilian rules"). Agency as a field of commercial law should, perhaps, be uniform
in all jurisdictions of an economic unity like the United States. Of. text at note
94, supra.
126. See Sentell v. Richardson, 211 La. 288, 29 So.2d 852 (1947) ; Comment,
8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 409, 414 (1948) ("The term mandate [is made] the
equivalent of the term agency in contract matters at common law"). Cf. SAUNDERS,
LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 499 (1925).
127. Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 499 (1925);
LA. R.S. 37:1447 ("Anyone who is injured or damaged by the agent or broker
... ") (1950).
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an undisclosed principal like a common law "agent.' 2 8 Further,
we do not know whether or not all other rules of the common
law of agency are applicable to a simple brokerage contract.
It is submitted that all these difficulties may be overcome
by realizing that as brokerage is distinguished from mandate, it
is also distinguished from agency. The broker as such is neither
agent nor mandatary in Louisiana, in the same way as not all
agents or mandataries are brokers. The two may under certain
circumstances coincide, and it may well happen for an agent to
be also a broker and for a broker to be an agent or mandatary.
129
But, ordinarily, the broker is simply an intermediary carrying
certain fiduciary obligations toward his principal, and, perhaps,
toward the third party to a transaction concluded through his
intervention. 3 0 As in the case of all other fiduciaries, the prin-
ciples of agency may apply by analogy and the broker may be
regarded as agent or mandatary in a figurative sense. Such
terminology, however, should be avoided as confusing. This ap-
proach may accord with the intention of the redactors of the
Civil Code of 1825 who, in drafting the articles under considera-
tion, relied heavily on Domat, and used the expression "the
broker ... is considered" rather than "is" a mandatary. More-
over, this interpretation may furnish an adequate basis for
reconciliation of numerous seemingly conflicting judicial deci-
sions in Louisiana.13
1
Selected problems in the light of Louisiana cases
Status of an intermediary: broker or agent? As brokerage
may be subject to a body of rules different from those governing
agency, it should be interesting to ascertain the status of an
128. Cf. text at notes 9, 15-18, supra.
129. See, e.g., Apple Growers Association v. Kohlman Brothers and Sugarman,
8 La. App. 165 (1928) ; Hughes Lumber Co. v. Madisonville Saw and Planing
Mill, 4 La. App. 662 (1926) ; Knotts v. Midkiff, 114 La. 234, 38 So. 153 (1905) ;
Marx v. Frey, 137 La. 948, 69 So. 757 (1915) ; Beal v. M'Kiernan, 6 La. 407
(1834); Conrey v. Hoover, 10 La. Ann. 437 (1855) (application of different
rules as to different parts of the same transaction; broker as to sale of bill of
exchange and agent as to negotiation of an extension) ; Scottish-American Mortg.
Co. v. Ogden, 49 La. Ann. 8, 21 So. 116 (1896) ; Wise v. Hayward and Clark, 9
Orl. App. 123 (1912) ; Woods v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880). Also a real
estate broker may be an agent. See Lucket Land and Emigration Co. v. Brown,
118 La. 943, 43 So. 628 (1907) (agency to sell real estate with a stipulation for
commission) ; Pickens v. Harris, 160 La. 628, 107 So. 470 (1926). Authority,
however, must be conferred in writing and in express terms. See Blythe v. Hall,
169 La. 1120, 126 So. 679 (1930) (telegram authorizing sale, held, not conferring
authority since terms and conditions of sale were unknown to the principal). See
also Canovsky v. Bonhage, 126 So. 252 (La. App. 1930).
130. Cf. text at notes 174-177, infra.
131. Of. text at notes 2-5, supra; 175-177, 206, 210, infra.
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intermediary, namely, to determine under what circumstances
a broker is simply a "broker" and under what circumstances
he is also (or only) an agent.1 32 In several instances the courts
were faced with this question and resorted to several tests.
In one case it was held that where the intermediary acts for
one of the parties he is an agent; where he acts for both of them
he is a broker. 3 3 This does not seem to be an adequate test for,
apart from other difficulties, double agency is permissible under
certain circumstances and the broker may well have acted as a
true agent for both parties. 3 4 In another case, some emphasis
was placed on the existence of an agreement for, and the kind of,
compensation. 135 The court seemed to indicate that brokers are
paid a commission, while agents furnish their services gra-
tuitously or for a stipulated salary like clerks and employees.
36
It is submitted that the method of compensation alone is not
sufficient to determine the status of an intermediary; the method
of compensation is ordinarily an incident of status - after it is
established. Actually, nothing can prevent the parties from
agreeing on a commission for the services of an agent and on a
salary for the services of a broker. Moreover, it was announced
in a more recent case that the fact that a commission was stipu-
lated for the compensation of a certain person "was not neces-
sarily" conclusive that the person in question was a broker.
37
132. The answer to the question whether the broker is an agent, and for whom,
may be important in the determination of respective rights and obligations between
principal and broker, principal and third parties, and broker and third parties.
(Cf. infra text at notes 144-146.) Specifically, an agency relationship, if estab-
lished, will be important in the determination of fiduciary duties owed by an agent
to his principhl (text at notes 174-177, infra), and with regard to the problem of
compensation, expenses, and termination of the contract (text at notes 205, 208,
211 infra). Further, an established agency relationship will be important with
regard to the validity of a transaction concluded through a broker (text at notes
147-151, inIra), and with regard to distribution of loss resulting from the agent's
representations, mistake, fraud, and violation of instructions (text at notes 152,
156, 159, infra). As "mandatary" has become synonymous with "agent" (text at
note 140, infra), the discussion is made in terms of agency rather than agency and
mandate.
133. See Dumaine and Co. v. Gay, Sullivan and Co., 188 So. 163 (La. App.
1939), quoting from City of Lake Charles v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
114 La. 836, 38 So. 578 (1905) ("A broker is defined by Art. 3016 of the Civil
Code to be an intermediary who is employed to negotiate a matter between two
parties and who, for this reason, is considered as mandatary for both. If, on the
other hand, he acts for only one of the principals, he is simply an agent for the
party who employed him."). See also Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La. Ann. 1343, 14 So.241
(1893).
134. Cf. text at note 164, infra.
135. Cf. Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La. Ann. 1343, 14 So. 241 (1893).
136. Ibid. "For the services of the former there is a fixed stated salary, while
for those of the latter, a compensation, commonly styled brokerage is allowed."
137. See Hughes Lumber Co. v. Madisonville Saw and Planing Mill, 4 La. App.
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Finally, it has been held that a broker is distinguished from
an agent in that the latter may "transfer or convey title" to
property under a power of attorney, while a broker is employed
merely to "secure a purchaser for the property; not to make title
on behalf of the owner." 138s This language in terms of power or
authority, though close to an analytically acceptable distinction,
may be confusing. If we were to proceed from the assumption
that the broker may bind his principal only in accordance with
a mandate, or an express power of attorney, the distinction
should be fully acceptable, for it would be only in such cases that
the broker would be regarded as agent.139 But since the courts
have moved away from the notion of representation and have
accepted the common law notion of agency, there may be in-
stances in which the broker, like any other person, may be
deemed to have implied or apparent authority to bind his prin-
cipal. In such cases the broker would be an agent although acting
without actual authority. 140  Since, then, agency may rest on
both actual and apparent consent, no valid distinction may be
made between agent and broker in terms of pre-existing power
or authority to bind his principal. In reality, it seems that there
is no general test to be applied. The existence of an agency re-
lationship, and the answer to the question whether or not the
broker acted as an agent and for whom, will be established in
each case as a fact on the basis of all the available evidence .'4
The impossibility of an a priori determination of the status
of an intermediary, however, does not defy all possibilities for
analysis. Thus, it is submitted, we may distinguish ex post facto
between a broker who, regardless of any understanding, con-
cludes the transaction himself (whether in his name or in the
662 (1926). See also Shaw v. Walker, 43 So.2d 700 (La. App. 1950) ("commis-
sion salesman" not a broker).
138. Isaac v. Dronet, 31 So.2d 299 (La. App. 1947).
139. Cf. Letarte, Problvmes Juridiques de l'agent d'immeubles, 9 REV. DU
BARIREXU 105, 107 (1949) ; aupra text at note 63.
140. Cf. Hughes Lumber Co. v. Madisonville Saw and Planing Mill, 4 La.
App. 662 (1926) ("The authority of a merchandise broker, need not be expressly
conferred, and in practice ordinarily is not.") ; notes 142-143, infra.
141. See, e.g., Apple Growers Association v. Kohlman Brothers and Sugarman,
8 La. App. 165 (1928); Hughes Lumber Co. v. Madisonville Saw and Planing
Mill, 4 La. App. 662 (1926) ; Woods v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880) (broker
vendee's agent) ; Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v. Ogden, 49 La. Ann. 8, 21 So.
116 (1896) (broker agent of the borrower) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Shreve-
port Cotton Oil Co., 111 La. 387, 35 So. 610 (1903) ; Millaudon v. Price, 3 La.
Ann. 4 (1848) (broker vendor's agent).' Cf. Blythe v. Hall, 169 La. 1120, 126 So.
679 (1930) ; Canovsky v. Bonhage, 126 So. 252 (La. App. 1930) ; Dey v. Nelkin,
131 La. 154, 59 So. 104 (1912) (no authority; no agency).
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name of his principal), and a broker who, acting simply as an
intermediary, brings the parties together and lets them alone
to conclude the transaction. On the basis of this factual distinc-
tion we may say that in the first instance the broker could, under
certain conditions, be an agent for one or even for both of the
parties.142 In the second case, the broker cannot be said to be an
agent in the accepted meaning of the word; he is simply a
broker. But as suggested above, this distinction can be nothing
more than a simple guide. 143
The broker as agent: instances of real agency. Quite fre-
quently, it is in the interest of some party to a transaction con-
cluded through a broker, whether principal, 144 broker, 145 or third
party, 146 to establish an agency relationship so that certain ques-
tions should be solved by reference to agency principles. 1 47 only
142. Cf. supra note 141; infra 164. In some instances the broker may act as
agent for both parties with regard to different aspects of the same transaction.
See, e.g., Shepherd v. Lanfear, 5 La. 336, 25 Am. Dec. 181 (1833). Where the
broker acts for an undisclosed principal, he is no longer a broker or agent, but a
principal. Pugh v. Moore, 44 La. Ann. 209, 10 So. 710 (1892) ; Sere v. Faures, 15
La. Ann. 189 (1860). Where the broker acts openly for a disclosed or a partially
disclosed principal, he will be regarded as agent unless it is proved to the satis-
faction of the court that the purported agent had no actual or apparent authority,
namely, that he was no agent at all. Such problems will be determined by reference
to the law of agency.
143. In some instances it may be futile to ask whether a given person is a
broker or an agent; it may make no difference or he may plainly be both. It is
believed, however, that such distinctions though not always valid serve in a ma-
jority of instances a useful purpose in analyzing and classifying the subject.
144. See, e.g., Knotts v. Midkiff, 114 La. 234, 38 So. 153 (1905) where the
principal had an interest in showing that the relation involved was agency rather
than brokerage so that, in absence of agreement, no commission was due. In
Pickens v. Harris, 160 La. 628, 107 So. 470 (1926) it was important for the
principal to show agency so that his alleged agent would have to account upon
resale of the property at a profit. See also Furlow v. Benoit, 124 La. 889, 50 So.
785 (1909).
145. See, e.g., Canovsky v. Bonhage, 126 So. 252 (La. App. 1930) where it
was to the interest of the broker to prove agency so that a valid contract could be
concluded between him (as agent) and the prospect, in which case commission
would be due. But cf. Shaw v. Walker, 43 So.2d 700 (1950) where the inter-
mediary was interested in showing a principal-broker relationship so that he would
be entitled to compensation by merely bringing the parties together.
146. Cf. text at notes 186, 191, 203, infra.
147. See, e.g., Apple Growers Association v. Kohlman Brothers and Sugarman,
8 La. App. 165 (1928) ; Hughes Lumber Co. v. Madisonville Saw and Planing
Mill, 4 La. App. 662 (1926) (mistake of agent) ; Woods v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann.
210 (1880) (ratification) ; Knotts v. Midkiff, 114 La. 234, 38 So. 153 (1905)
(fiduciary duties) ; Pugh v. Moore, 44 La. Ann. 209, 10 So. 710 (1892) ; Sere v.
Faures, 15 La. Ann. 189 (1860) (undisclosed principal) ; Soudieu v. Faures, 12
La. Ann. 746 (1857) (agent acting contrary to instructions) ; Wise v. Hayward,
9 Orl. App. 123 (La. App. 1912) (no real or apparent authority). See also Beal
v. M'Kiernan, 6 La. 407 (1834) ; Conrey v. Hoover, 10 La. Ann. 437 (1855);
Furlow v. Benoit, 124 La. 889, 50 So. 785 (1909) ; Leverich v. Richards, 1 La.
Ann. 348 (1846) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Shreveport Cotton Oil Co., 111 La.
387, 35 So. 610 (1903).
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a treatise on agency could, perhaps, cover all possible applica-
tions of agency principles to a contract of brokerage coinciding
with agency. At this point, the discussion will be limited to cer-
tain actual problems raised by Louisiana cases. The aspects of
agency law involved in such cases concern in the main the fi-
duciary duties of an agent to his principal (which are discussed
elsewhere) ,141 the authority of an agent to conclude a valid trans-
action binding upon his principal, and the distribution of loss
resulting from the agent's representations, mistake, fraud, and
the non-disclosure of information.
(I) Authority. The broker as such has no actual or ap-
parent authority to bind his principal. However, where an agency
relationship is established by the interested party, the broker
may have such authority qua agent.149 In general, the authority
of such agent-brokers has been narrowly construed in Louisiana,
at least where it was known to the third party that the alleged
agent was also a broker.'50 In a series of cases involving suits
for specific performance of contracts concluded by brokers (as
agents) the courts imposed a remarkably restrictive interpreta-
tion on the agent's authority and refused to hold the principal
bound to the agreement.' 5 '
(II) Knowledge, instructions, mistake, and representations.
Under the law of agency, the knowledge of facts known to the
agent may be imputed to the principal. 152 Where the agent is a
broker, the same rule applies. 5 3
It is also a well-settled rule of the law of agency that private
148. See text at notes 174-191, infra.
149. Cf. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF TIlE LAW OF AGENCY 38 (1952).
150. See Leverich v. Richards, 1 La. Ann. 348 (1846) where it was held that
the intermediary had no authority to pledge property entrusted him for sale;
"being known as a broker, those who dealt with him dealt at their peril."
151. See Blythe v. Hall, 169 La. 1120, 126 So. 679 (1930), involving suit for
specific performance by vendee against vendor of real estate. There was a tele-
gram in evidence authorizing the broker to sell. The court held that it did not
confer authority since the terms and conditions of sale were not known to the
principal. See also Canovsky v. Bonhage, 126 So. 252 (La. App. 1930) ; Dey v.
Nelkin, 131 La. 154, 59 So. 104 (1912).
152. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 70 ff. (1952) ; Seixas v.
Citizens Bank of Louisiana, 38 La. Ann. 424 (1886) ("The knowledge of an agent
is the knowledge of the principal").
153. See Lippman v. Rice Millers Distributing Co., 156 La. 471, 100 So. 769
(1924) ("Both plaintiff and defendant were charged with constructive knowledge,
regardless of actual knowledge, of all material facts and information in the pos-
session of their agent acting within the scope of his employment") ; Tulane Im-
provement Co. v. Chapman and Co., 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509 (1911) (lessor
charged with agent's knowledge that lessee acted for a corporation rather than as
individual).
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or secret instructions given by the principal to his agent are not
binding on the third party.14 Accordingly, where an agency
relationship is established, instructions given by the principal to
the broker are of no interest to the prospect who in ignorance
of such instructions concludes a bargain with the broker. In
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Shreveport Cotton Oil Co.,"s5 a broker
acting as agent for sellers of oil disobeyed his principal's instruc-
tions and sold oil of a higher grade at a price set for oil of a
lower grade. The court declared that the sellers' having held out
the broker as their agent authorized to make the sale were bound
by his acts notwithstanding any secret instructions they might
have given him.
According to another well-established principle of the law
of agency the agent's mistake is to be imputed to the principal. 56
Accordingly, where it is established that the broker acted as
agent for one of the parties to the transaction, any mistake
made by the broker will be imputed to his principal. In Rocchi
v. Schwabacher,"5 7 plaintiff, through a broker acting as his agent,
bought lands from defendant which proved to be of an inferior
quality. Defendant made no representations as to the quality of
the lands; the real estate broker who acted as agent for the pur-
chaser, by mistake, concluded the transaction in the belief the
lands were of the specified quality. The court, having found
that the fault was with the broker who did not exercise due
diligence, held that the broker's mistake should be imputed to
the principal. And in Apple Growers Association v. Kohlman
Brothers and Sugarman,"'8 a sale of apples was negotiated and
concluded through a broker. By mistake, the broker caused the
wrong quality of apples to be sent to the wrong destination, and
damage resulted. The court found that the broker acted as agent
for the purchaser and imputed the broker's mistake to the latter.
"Secret private instructions," the court declared, "however bind-
ing they may be between the principal and the agent, can have
no effect on a third person who deals with the agent in good
faith, in ignorance of the instructions or limitations."
Finally, it is well established that the principal is liable for
his agent's representations, and according to the prevailing view
154. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 64 et seq. (1952).
155. 111 La. 387, 35 So. 610 (1903).
156. See MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 1308 et seq. (1914).
157. 33 La. Ann. 1364 (1881).
158. 8 La. App. 165 (1928).
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in the United States for the agent's misrepresentations and
fraud. 15 9 Similarly, unauthorized representations made by an
agent acting as broker will bind the principal. An early Louisi-
ana case, however, indicated that a principal may under some
circumstances be excused for misrepresentations and fraud prac-
ticed by such an agent.160
(III) Ratification. As the acts of any other person assum-
ing agency powers may be ratified by the supposed principal,
the acts of a broker who acted without authority or exceeded his
authority may be ratified. Strictly speaking, the problem is not
one of agency or of authority to bind ;161 however, once ratifica-
tion is made, the principles of agency apply. In Woods v. Roc-
chi,1 62 plaintiff bought a certain quantity of land through a
broker, who, as the court found out, was acting as his agent. The
broker, while informing his principal that the bargain was con-
cluded at a certain price, in reality closed the transaction at a
much higher price. The purchaser learned of the true situation
only after a substantial portion of the merchandise was delivered.
The court held that the principal, by accepting the remaining
portion of the goods with knowledge of the true situation, rati-
fied the contract as made by his agent or pretended agent.
The broker as intermediary: no agency. (I) "Common man-
datary": a technical expression. It is a general rule of the law
of agency that no one can be agent of two parties in the same
transaction, except where the parties, with full knowledge, ex-
pressly agree on such double agency. 16 3 In Louisiana, it has been
held that a person may be agent of two parties in the same trans-
action provided there is no collusion or conflicting interests. 6 4
159. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 84, 92 (1952).
160. See Woods v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880).
161. Cf. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 127 et seq. (1952).
162. 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880). See also Blanchard v. Patterson, 9 La. App.
706, 119 So. 902 (1929) (contract between artist and agent; principal bound by
ratification).
163. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 346 et seq. (1952).
164. See Draughon v. Quillen, 23 La. Ann. 237 (1871) ("The same person
cannot be the agent of two parties in the same transaction when their interests
are conflicting") ; Florance v. Adams, 2 Rob. 556, 38 Am. Dec. 226 (La. 1842) ;
Shepherd v. Lanfear, 5 La. 336, 25 Am. Dec. 181 (1833) ("The mandatary in this
case was the agent of the plaintiff for the ship, and of the defendant for the
cargo. The powers were separate; the interests were distinct; the objects were
different; and . . . he could have discharged his duties of agent for each with
perfect propriety."). See also Conn Lumber Co. v. Hortman-Salmen Co., 12 La.
App. 165, 125 So. 137 (1929), involving suit by seller of lumber against purchaser
on a contract concluded by the latter's agent. The validity of the contract was
upheld although the agent was subsequently employed by the seller to supervise
the lumbermen.
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Ordinarily, the parties to a contract concluded through brokers
have adverse interests and it seems that real double agency
should be permissible only under exceptional circumstances.
Thus, an intermediary in absence of express authorization by
both parties acting with full knowledge of the situation, may
well discharge the function of a broker and that of an agent rep-
resenting one of the parties, but he may not act as agent for both.
He may negotiate and bring the parties together, but he cannot
conclude a deal.16 5 In Beal v. M'Kiernn, 66 an early Louisiana
case, the court, placing emphasis on the conflicting interests of
the parties, refused to uphold the validity of a contract concluded
by a broker representing both of them on the ground that "where
there is but one person, there can be no agreement, no obliga-
tion; for there is not the concurrence of two minds, no one per-
son bound to the other ... A has an order from B to purchase
cotton, and from C to sell his crop; he determines on selling C's
cotton to B. The price has been determined by one person only;
there is not that concurrence of two minds; aggregation men-
tium is essential to the formation of the contract."
Nevertheless, the broker is frequently termed "a common
agent" or "common mandatary.' ' 67 It is submitted that such lan-
guage is misleading: it is merely a metaphor of doubtful util-
ity.168 Actually all cases in point involved attempts at rationaliz-
ing the application by analogy of certain agency principles to a
simple brokerage contract (as defined) rather than instances
where a broker having actual authority acted as agent for both
parties. "Common mandatary" seems thus to be a technical ex-
pression and when used by the courts may be taken as the state-
ment of a conclusion, namely, that the rights and liabilities of
the parties are to be determined under the circumstances by ref-
erence to agency principles, applicable by analogy. Where inter-
165. See Rhodes & Symes v. Nadeski, 119 So. 292 (La. App. 1928) (an offer
addressed to brokers as agents, and signed by them as agents is not valid as an
offer). However, a broker starting out as agent of one party may subsequently
serve as a middleman and thus receive a commission from both parties. See Pardue
v. Sitman, 148 So. 288, 289 (1933) ("There is no inconsistency in occupying, as
between Sitman and Humphreys, the position of a broker or intermediary under
the Civil Code, Arts. 3016 et seq., and the fact that she may have started out as
the agent of Sitman did not prevent her subsequently becoming the broker and
intermediary").
166. 6 La. 407 (1834).
167. See, e.g., Codifier v. Holdsworth, 7 La. App. 395 (1928) ; Fellmann v.
Smith, Or]. App. No. 8068 (1921) ; Dane and Northrup v. Selzer, 63 So.2d 760
(La. App. 1953) ; Dumaine and Co. v. Gay, Sullivan and Co., 188 So. 163 (La.
App. 1939).
168. Cf. text at notes 130-131, supra; text at note 193, infra.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ested parties attempted to reason from the premise that the
broker is a "common mandatary," and thus to import agency
principles wholesale, the courts readily answered that the broker
is a common mandatary or common agent only "in a sense ' '1 69
and "for some purposes. ' 170 The allegation that the broker "rep-
resented both parties, does not alter the situation.'1'1  Actually,
"it is only in facilitating the transaction of business in relation
to the sale and purchase of produce, that the broker is considered
as the common agent of the parties, the channel of communica-
tion between them. For any other purpose he is not regarded by
law as agent of either party.'
172
In general, the phrase "common mandatary" is resorted to
with reference to fiduciary duties owed by a broker toward both
parties and in situations where one of the parties, whether prin-
cipal, broker, or prospect, is interested in holding the other party
to the agreement.
173
(IV) Brokerage: a sui generis contract. In a forthcoming
paper I shall have the opportunity to analyze and discuss all inci-
dents of a brokerage contract in Louisiana. At this point, I shall
confine myself to a brief summary of Louisiana cases which as
a whole demonstrate that brokerage has emerged as a sui generis
contract, quite independent from agency and mandate.
(1) Fiduciary duties. It is well established that a broker
owes certain fiduciary duties to his principal as soon as their re-
lationship comes into existence.174 On the other hand, no clear
rule may be deduced from the cases with regard to the broker's
fiduciary duties toward the third party to a transaction. Most
cases seem to indicate absence of such duties during the nego-
tiations.1 75 According to some of these cases the broker assumes
fiduciary duties toward the third party only after the bargain
169. See Treadaway v. Giangrosso, 16 So.2d 677 (La. App. 1944).
170. See Apple Growers Association v. Kohlman Brothers and Sugarman, 8
La. App. 165 (1928).
171. See Treadaway v. Giangrosso, 16 So.2d 677 (La. App. 1944).
172. See Toledano v. Klingender, 6 La. 691 (1834).
173. See text at notes 174-177, 198-201, infra.
174. See Hughes Lumber Co. v. Madisonville Saw and Planing Mill, 4 La.
App. 662, 667 (1926) ("At the outset the broker is the agent of the party who
first employs him") ; Apple Growers Association v. Kohlman Brothers and Sugar-
man, 8 La. App. 165 (1928) (a broker is for some purposes the agent of both
parties but primarily of the party who employs him). See also Seybold v. Fidelity
and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 197 La. 287, 1 So.2d 522 (1941).
175. See Pfeifer and Co. v. Mayer & Co., 3 La. App. 289 (1925) ("from the
moment of the confirmation"). See also infra note 177. But cf. Comment, 17
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 820-829 (1957).
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is "definitely closed. ' 176 It is only then that the broker may be
regarded as a common mandatary in the sense that he owes fidu-
ciary duties to both parties.1 77
The content of the broker's fiduciary duties, originally due
to the person Who first employed him and after the transaction
is definitely closed to both parties, is largely undefinable. Such
duties are to be determined in principle by reference to the law
of agency.17  It is questionable, however, whether the duties im-
posed on a broker are entirely co-extensive with those imposed
on an ordinary agent. 79 Thus, it has been held that a broker is
under no obligation to advise his principal with regard to ob-
viously unfavorable terms of an offer and with regard to the
"foolishness" of a transaction. 8 0
Most actions against brokers are based on actual misrepre-
176. See e.g., Martin v. Fontenot, 27 So.2d 457 (La. App. 1946) ; Conley v.
Dilbeck Dominey Ins. Agency, Inc. 40 So.2d 820 (La. App. 1949) ; Woods, Slay-
back & Co. v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880). But cf. Hughes Lumber Co. v.
Madisonville Saw and Planing Mill, 4 La. App. 662 (1926) (the broker "becomes
the agent of the other also, when the latter instructs him to close the bargain").
177. Perhaps, a distinction could be drawn to the effect that the broker becomes
"common mandatary" and assumes fiduciary duties toward both parties only after
a valid contract is concluded. Most such cases involve suits for the return of de-
posit. See Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761 (1918) ; Titus v.
Cunningham, 164 La. 431, 114 So. 86 (1927); Hanemann v. Uhry, 8 La. App.
534 (1928) (transactions not consummated; broker not a common mandatary).
Martin v. Fontenot, 27 So.2d 457 (La. App. 1946) ; Conley v. Dilbeck Dominey
Ins. Agency, Inc., 40 So.2d 820 (La. App. 1949) ; Woods, Slayback & Co. v.
Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1890) (consummated transactions; broker a common
mandatory). But of. Dunn v. Spiro, 153 So. 316 (La. App. 1934) ; Hill v.
Maguire, 19 La. App. 798, 140 So. 169 (1932); Smith v. Blache, 19 La. App.
594, 140 So. 147 (1932) (transactions not consummated; yet, broker a common
mandatary).
178. Cf. Assunto v. Coleman, 159 La. 537, 104 So. 318 (1925) (broker ac-
quired interest in property adverse to that of his principal; held, the broker was a
constructive trustee holding the interest for his principal) ; Conrey v. Hoover, 10
La. Ann. 437 (1855) (assistance to the parties "to carry out their original con-
tract in good faith") ; Roubieu v. Palmer, 10 La. Ann. 320 (1855) (return of
benefits) ; Rhodes & Symes v. Nadeski, 119 So. 292 (La. App. 1928) (unauthorized
return of earnest money to purchaser; held, a breach of fiduciary duty) ; Pfeiffer
and Co. v. Mayer and Co., 3 La. App. 289 (1925) ("every duty involving necessary
notice").
179. Agents are held to a standard of "utmost good faith." Draughon v.
Quillen, 23 La. Ann. 237 (1871). Cf. infra note 180.
180. Spiro v. Corliss, 174 So. 285 (La. App. 1937). An agent is expected to
account to his principal for all profits realized in connection with his agency. A
broker may be entitled to keep such profits. See Furlow v. Benoit, 124 La. 889,
50 So. 785 (1909) (no duty to account for profits realized by sale of goods above
the price set by the principal).
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sentation,181 violation of instructions, 8 2 and fraud, 8 3 and very
few cases involve attempts by principals or third parties at hold-
ing the broker to a fiduciary obligation.18 4 Such obligations
come mainly into focus in cases where one of the parties, whether
principal or prospect, brings action against the broker to recover
a deposit' 8 ' given for a transaction which was never consum-
mated. In this group of cases the courts identify the person en-
titled to the deposit by characterizing the broker as agent of one
or of the other party, or as common agent of both. Indeed, if
the broker is to be regarded as agent of the party claiming the
deposit, he should account to that party; if, on the other hand,
the broker is deemed to have acted as agent for the other party,
he has no obligations toward the claimant, but toward his prin-
cipal. Finally, if the broker is to be regarded as a "common
agent," he should be responsible to both parties.
181. See, e.g., Buddecke v. Harris, 20 La. Ann. 563 (1868) involving suit by
purchaser of dishonored note against broker on the ground the latter wilfully
misrepresented the credit of the debtor. Held, no recovery. Plaintiff knew he was
dealing with a broker who is not responsible unless expressly personally bound.
But cf. Todd v. Burke, 27 La. Ann. 385 (1875). Brokers, in good faith, advised
customer to invest on forged note, secured by forged mortgage. Testimony tended
to show that the brokers "vouched for the correctness, and honesty, and up-
rightness of the mortgage." Held, "the plaintiff was induced to lend her money"
and is entitled to recover.
182. See Pfeiffer and Co. v. Mayer and Co., 3 La. App. 289 (1925) (broker
liable to purchaser of potatoes for damage resulting from violation of instructions).
See also Soudieu v. Faures, 12 La. Ann. 746 (1857). Broker undertook to make
safe investments of plaintiff's money. He disobeyed instructions and did not invest
as directed. Held, "[he] is responsible for the loss consequent upon that im-
prudence and violation of instruction, unless plaintiff is shown to have ratified his
action, after disclosure of all the material facts." But cf. Winston v. Tufts Femor
& Hobart, 10 La. Ann. 23 (1855).
183. Cf. Amato v. Latter and Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So.2d 873 (1955),
involving suit by prospect against broker for failure to transmit an offer to the
principal. Although there was no "privity of contract," and apparently no viola-
tions of a general duty due by the broker to the prospect, the court allowed re-
covery by relying on LA. R.S. 37:1447 (1950), providing as follows: "Any one
who is injured or damaged by the agent or broker by any wrongful act done in the
furtherance of such business or by any fraud or misrepresentation by the agent or
broker may sue for the recovery of the damage before any court of competent
jurisdiction." See also infra note 184.
184. See, e.g., Seybold v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 197 La. 287,
1 So.2d 522 (1941) ; Rhodes and Symes v. Nadeski, 119 So. 292 (La. App. 1928).
See also Therbone v. Cougot and Joubert, 3 La. App. 771 (1926), involving suit
by tenants against brokers for renting defective property. The court held that
the brokers were not liable to third persons for nonfeasance or for mere omission
of duty, due only to their principals. Spiro v. Corliss, 174 So. 285 (La. App.
1937) (broker not liable for failure to reveal to prospective purchaser that there
were outstanding encumbrances to the property to be conveyed, although the prop-
erty was to be conveyed free of all encumbrances). But cf. supra note 183.
185. Quite frequently, a suit for the return of a deposit is connected with the
issue whether or not the broker has earned his commission. See Boisseau v. Valon
and Jordano, 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932) ; Boone v. David, 52 So.2d 563 (La.
App. 1951) ; Gairens v. Valenti, 17 La. App. 180, 135 So. 84 (1931) ; Roe Y.
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In Conley v. Dilbeck D ominey Ins. Agency, Inc., 186 plaintiff
brought suit against insurance broker to recover deposits on
premiums received and held by the broker on behalf of the in-
surer who in the meanwhile had become insolvent. Plaintiff's
theory was that the broker was a common mandatary, and as
such, under an obligation to return to him, at his order, all de-
posits in his hands. The court, although granting that the broker
was a common mandatary, held that in receiving the money he
was the agent of the insurer. Consequently, payment should be
made to the receiver of the insolvent rather than to plaintiff.
1 87
In another case, Maloney v. Aschaffenburg,5 8 plaintiff owner of
real estate brought suit against broker to recover a deposit al-
legedly forfeited by the purchaser. This time it was the broker
who objected that as a "common mandatary" he was under a
duty to account to both parties and that the purchaser should be
made a party defendant. The court held that the broker owed no
fiduciary duty to the purchaser since the transaction was never
consummated, and ordered him to pay the deposit to plaintiff.1 19
And in Dunn v. Spiro,90 plaintiff purchaser brought suit against
a real estate broker to recover a deposit given as a part payment
for the purchase of property. The contract of sale was conceded-
ly void for indefiniteness. This time the defendant broker rested
his defense on the ground that he was the agent of a disclosed
principal, the vendor, and consequently, plaintiff should seek
redress against that principal. The court held that the broker
was the agent of both parties and ordered the return of the de-
posit to the purchaser, thus in reality regarding the broker as
the latter's agent.' 91
Maniscalco, 174 La. 526, 141 So. 49 (1932) ; Izquierdo v. Kenner, 11 La. App.
594, 123 So. 366 (1929); Villemeur v. Woodward, 134 So. 111 (La. App. 1931).
186. 40 So.2d 820 (La. App. 1949).
187. In another case, Titus v. Cunningham, 164 La. 431, 114 So. 86 (1927),
plaintiff purchaser of real estate brought suit against a broker to recover a deposit
given on account of a sale that was never consummated. He claimed also that the
broker was a common mandatary holding the deposit subject to his order. The
court disposed of the case on the ground that the understanding was that the
deposit should be paid by the broker to the owner of the real estate.
188. 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761 (1918).
189. But cf. Hill v. Maguire, 19 La. App. 798, 140 So. 169 (1932), where a
prospective purchaser brought suit against the vendor for specific performance of
a contract to sell and in the alternative for the return of a deposit. The court de-
clared that the deposit was recoverable only from the broker since he was a common
mandatary. See also Baumann v. Michel, 190 La. 1, 181 So. 549 (1938) ; Cabral
v. Barkerding, 50 So.2d 516 (La. App. 1951).
190. 153 So. 316 (La. App. 1934).
191. But cf. Martin v. Fontenot, 27 So.2d 457 (1946). Plaintiff prospective
purchaser of property brought suit against broker to recover deposit given on ac-
count of a transaction that was never consummated. The court, consistently with
its classification of the broker as a common mandatary, held that the seller was a
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The real problem in such cases is who should recover a de-
posit given for a frustrated contract and how the broker should
be protected from ungrounded demands. Where, as it frequently
happens, a deposit is given by the purchaser to accompany an
offer made to the seller, and such offer is not accepted, it seems
that the purchaser should be entitled to recover his deposit.192
The obligation of the broker to return the deposit in such cases
need not be justified on grounds of agency. 1 93 Where, on the
other hand, the purchaser's deposit accompanies an acceptance of
an offer made by the seller, and where a contract to sell or sale
is concluded, but for some reason one of the parties defaults or
claims that the transaction is invalid, the broker should hold the
deposit until a judicial determination of the issue.' 94 It is pre-
cisely in the last situation that the imposition of a fiduciary duty
on the broker toward both parties may be well justified.
(2) Authority to receive communications. We have seen
that a broker concluding a transaction himself may be regarded
under some circumstances as agent and may bind his principal
even in absence of actual authority. As in the case of any other
agent, the broker's knowledge of certain facts, his mistake, his
representations, and at times his misrepresentations and fraud,
may thus be imputed to the principal. On the other hand, it is
clear from the cases that a broker acting merely as intermediary
has no authority, and, with regard to all such instances, he is
a third party in the relations between principal.and prospect.
The only debatable point is whether a broker (acting merely
as an intermediary) has authority to receive communications
binding on the person who resorts to his services. In general,
communications to the agent are binding upon the principal, and
in case of a contractual transaction, an offer made to, and an
acceptance received by, the agent, result in a contract binding
upon the principal and the third party.1 95 In some instances, the
necessary party defendant and that accounting should be made to both parties.
Cf. infra note 193.
192. Cf. supra note 190.
193. See Gairens v. Valenti, 17 La. App. 180, 135 So. 84 (1931); Villemeur
v. Woodward, 134 So. 111 (La. App. 1931) ; Roe v. Maniscalco, 174 La. 526, 141
So. 49 (1932) ; Boisseau v. Valon and Jordano, 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932)
(deposit returned to purchaser without reference to agency principles). Cf.
Izquierdo v. Kenner, 11 La. App. 594, 123 So. 366 (1939) (negotiorum gestio-
quasi contract).
194. Cf. supra note 191.
195. See MECHEM, A TRFATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENcY 1623 et seq. (1914).
Different rules may apply with regard to formalities. Thus, the authority given to
an agent to sell immovable property belonging to the principal must be in writing.
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person first to resort to the services of a broker (principal) signs
an offer to sell or purchase under certain specified conditions. 19 6
In other cases, it is the prospect located by the broker who signs
such an offer, or accepts an offer already made by the princi-
pal.197 The problem in all cases is whether the person signing
an offer authorizes the broker by implication to receive an ac-
ceptance so that upon its receipt the transaction would be con-
cluded.
The courts have consistently refused to consider the broker
as the agent of either the offeror, authorized to receive an ac-
ceptance, or of the offeree, authorized to receive an offer. In
Hanneman v. Uhry,195 involving an action for the recovery of
rent under an alleged lease, defendant argued that there was no
contract since lessor's acceptance of his offer was addressed to
the broker and was not binding on him. The court held that the
broker was not lessee's agent and that, although the latter had
deposited with the broker an offer to lease, the broker was not
authorized to receive an acceptance. Further, the case clearly
implies that the broker was not plaintiff's agent authorized to
receive an offer, although originally employed by him to rent and
sell the property. In Canovsky v. Bondage, 99 the court also found
that an offer submitted by the prospect to the broker did not
result in a valid contract since the principal never accepted the
offer and the broker had no authority to accept on behalf of the
principal. The argument that the owner had authorized the
broker to receive and accept an offer complying fully with the
owner's terms was of no avail. The reluctance of the courts to
consider the broker as agent of either party authorized to re-
ceive communications is further illustrated in the case of Tread-
away v. Giangrosso.20 0 In that case, the owner of real estate
"listed" with the broker signed an offer to sell at a certain price
and deposited the same with the broker. A prospect found by
the broker signed an offer to buy the property according to the
Whatley v. McMillan, 152 La. 978, 94 So. 905 (1922). On the other hand, a
broker employed merely to procure a purchaser with whom the principal will him-
self conclude the contract, need not have written authority. Kernagham and Cor-
dill v. Uthoff, 174 La. 880, 141 So. 865 (1932) ; Isaac v. Dronet, 31 So.2d 299
(La. App. 1947) ; Lally v. Dossat, 31 So.2d 41 (La. App. 1947).
196. See, e.g., infra note 200.
197. See, e.g., infra notes 198, 199, 200.
198. 8 La. App. 534 (1928).
199. 126 So. 252 (La. App. 1930).
200. 16 So.2d 677 (La. App. 1944). See also Fowler v. Phillips, 159 La. 668,
106 So. 26 (1925) (dismissing vendee's action for specific performance; offer
accepted 'by broker after the listing was cancelled).
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terms of the owner. The court held that there was no contract,
as there was no offer and acceptance, but two offers in identical
terms to sell and purchase. "The fact that Treadaway was a real
estate agent," the court announced, "and therefore, in a sense,
represented both parties, does not alter the situation."
20
'
(8) Authority to receive payment. The authority of an
agent to receive payment on behalf of his principal is generally
subject to limitations and is strictly construed. 20 2 It is well estab-
lished on the other hand that the broker has no authority to re-
ceive payment. "To justify a payment ... made to a broker, a
purchaser is bound to show, either a general custom, or a special
authority from the vendor. ' '20 3 In absence then of express actual
authority the purchaser may be obliged to second payment.
(4) Compensation. In contrast to the contract of mandate,
which is gratuitous in absence of express agreement, 20 4 the prin-
cipal in a contract of brokerage assumes the obligation to com-
pensate the broker even in absence of stipulation with regard to
commission.205 The issue was squarely raised in Doll v. Weiblen
Marble and Granite Co., 20 6 involving a suit by a broker against a
lessee of properties for a commission allegedly earned when the
broker found the prospect and actively participated in the nego-
201. But cf. Dane and Northrup v. Selzer, 63 So.2d 760, 762 (La. App. 1953).
In this case a prospective vendee submitted a written offer to a broker to buy
property listed with him and, upon the conclusion of the transaction, to pay a
stipulated commission. The offer was promptly accepted by the vendor in writing
but the broker failed to communicate the vendor's acceptance to the offeror. The
broker's right to a commission seemed to depend on whether or not a valid con-
tract had been concluded. The court held that the contract was perfect and valid
and that written communication to the purchaser was not necessary. "A real
estate agent," the court said, "is the agent of both parties to such a contract, and
when Mrs. Waimer [vendee] authorized her agent to transmit her offer to Mrs.
Buras [vendor], she authorized the agent to receive the acceptance of Mrs. Buras.
Therefore the contract was completed and became binding as soon as the offer of
Mrs. Waimer, which was made in writing was given to the agent."
202. See MECHEM, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 40 (1952).
203. Toledano v. Klingender, 6 La. 691, 695 (1834) ("In the absence of
proof of any authority in the broker to receive payment, or of any act from which
such authority might be presumed, we are of opinion that the defendant acted
without due caution").204. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2991 (1870); Conrey v. Hoover, 10 La. Ann.
437, 438 (1855) ("It is perfectly clear that the services were not rendered by the
plaintiff as broker .. .but as attorney in fact .... There being no contrary agree-
ment, it is clear that the procuration in this case must be looked upon as gra-
tuitions, a mere office d'amie"). See also Knotts v. Midkiff, 114 La. 234, 38 So.
153 (1905) (broker acted as agent in the sale of real estate; no commission).
205. See Doll v. Weiblen Marble and Granite Co. 207 La. 769, 22 So.2d 59
(1945) ; Sugar Field Oil Co. v. Carter, 214 La. 586, 38 So.2d 249 (1948) ; Isaac
v. Calcasieu Bldg. and Loan Association, 139 So. 490 (La. App. 1932) ; Harvey v.
Winters, 1 La. App. 383 (1925). But cf. Latter and Blum, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 208 La. 490, 23 So.2d 193 (1945).
206. 207 La. 769, 22 So.2d 59 (1945).
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tiations. There was no agreement with regard to commission and
the defendant alleged that, as the relationship was one of man-
date, Article 2991 of the Civil Code controlled and no commission
was due. The court held that Article 2991 was inapplicable in
the determination of the principal's liability toward the broker.
"We do not think this case presents factual issues controlled by
Art. 2991 of the Revised Civil Code," the court declared, "but
rather that it is governed by the jurisprudence'of the courts of
this state to the effect that where one employs the services of an-
other without specifying what compensation will be paid there-
for, or where one avails himself of the services of another in
the performance of a task, he is bound to compensate the person
so employed or who performs such a service." 207
(5) Expenses. Another difference between mandate, agen-
cy, and brokerage involves the right of the broker to claim ex-
penses. In Blanc v. The New Orleans Improvement & Bank Co.,208
plaintiff signed a contract with a bank to the effect that if he
were successful in procuring a loan he would be entitled to a per-
centage. He was unsuccessful, and he claimed reimbursement of
expenses instead. The court held that he was not entitled to re-
imbursement as he was a broker rather than an agent. "The
agent is entitled to the reimbursement of the expenses he has
incurred in the execution of his agency," the court declared,
"even where he has been absolutely unsuccessful." Here, "the
contract was merely one of brokerage, where nothing is paid,
unless a bargain is effected. '20
9
207. Brokerage differs not only from mandate but also from the contract of
employment. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2745 et seq. (1870). The courts, on several
occasions, tried to draw such a line of distinction. In one case the court observed
that "there is a vast difference between the services of a broker and that of a sales-
man or clerk. A broker is a middleman or negotiator between two parties. He does
not have possession, management, or control of the property to be sold. His prin-
cipal business is to bring the parties together." Shaw v. Walker, 43 So.2d 700
(La. App. 1950). In another case the court found "the leading and essential dif-
ference" between a clerk and broker is that "the former hires his services exclu-
sively to one person, while the latter is employed to make bargains and contracts
between other persons in matters of trade, commerce, and navigation. For the
services of the former there is a fixed stated salary, while for those of the latter,
a compensation, commonly styled brokerage is allowed." Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La.
Ann. 1343, 1346, 14 So. 241, 243 (1893). The distinction may be important with
regard to the broker's right to a commission. In Shaw v. Walker, supra, plaintiff
enter into a verbal agreement with defendant to find prospective puchasers of
air-conditioning equipment at a 10 percent commission. Defendant claimed that
plaintiff was a "salesman" rather than "broker." Thus, commission would be
earned only with regard to bargains closed by plaintiff himself and not upon the
conclusion of any bargain with one of plaintiff's prospects. The court found that
the alleged broker was a salesman and dismissed the claim for a commission.
208. 2 Rob. 63 (La. 1842).
209. Cf. Williams Pinkard & Co. v. Aroni, 35 La. Ann. 1115 (1883) (cotton
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(6) Termination of contract. In contrast to mandate,210
brokerage does not terminate upon the death of the principal.
The courts have been able to reach this result by classifying
brokerage as a contract of employment rather than mandate. In
Richardson v. Bradford,211 there was an exclusive listing for a
period of a year, and the principal died during that year. The
heirs claimed that the contract, being a mandate, had expired;
the broker, on the other hand, claimed that the contract was one
of employment and that in spite of the death of the principal it
was still in effect. The court held that "we cannot agree with the
view that a contract of the kind in this case is governed by the
law of mandate as laid down in Articles 3016 et seq. of the Re-
vised Civil Code." And, following a finding that the contract was
one of employment, the obligation was declared heritable.
2 12
(7) Suits by and against a broker. While there are some
doubts with regard to the right of an agent to bring suit against
the other party to a transaction, "it is well settled that a broker
may not maintain an action on a contract which he has nego-
tiated for his principal against the other party to the contract
unless the broker has acquired a special interest which confers
upon him the right to sue. ' 213 Similarly, no suit may be brought
against the broker for breach of contract by the principal.
2 1 4
broker entitled to out-of-pocket expenses; contract of employment) ; Blackshear v.
Landley, 46 So.2d 688 (La. App. 1950) (failure to consummate a contract to sell
caused by title defect arising subsequent to the fruition of an executory contract
and through no fault of the principal).
210. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3027 (1870).
211. 153 La. 725, 96 So. 546 (1923).
212. See also Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La. Ann.. 1343, 14 So. 241 (1893) (sugar
broker a clerk; obligation heritable).
213. Dumaine and Co. v. Gay, Sullivan and Co., 188 So. 163 (La. App.
1939).
214. Honore v. White, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 219 (La. 1823) ("A suit for the breach
of contract made through an agent, should be brought against the principal for
whom the agent contracted").
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